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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT








This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial.' The 
Defendant has filed an Opposition to this motion.1 2 3For the reasons which follow, the Court 
GRANTS the Motion for New Trial, applying the correct standard for determining “disability” 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). However, for the reason set forth below, 
the Court ultimately reaches the same conclusion that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgmenf should be granted under the law and facts of this case.
I. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A court should refrain from altering or amending a ruling or judgment under Rule 
59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless one of the following grounds is 
present: (1) the judgment is based upon manifest errors of law or fact; (2) the existence of 
newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) manifest injustice will result; or
1 Rec. Doc. No. 19.
2 Rec. Doc. No. 21.
3 Rec. Doc. No. 12.
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(4) an intervening change in controlling law has occurred.4 Further, "[altering, amending, 
or reconsidering a judgment is an extraordinary measure, which courts should use 
sparingly.”5 Thus, "rulings should only be reconsidered 'where the moving party has 
presented substantial reasons for consideration.’”6
The Court previously ruled that the Plaintiff, who suffers from bipolar disorder, 
depression, anxiety, and ADHD, was not disabled underthe ADA.7 The Court also granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Plaintiffs retaliation claim finding that 
Defendant presented a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Plaintiffs termination which 
Plaintiff failed to rebut with evidence of pretext. The Defendant’s proffered reason for 
termination was based on Plaintiffs excessive absenteeism and tardiness.8
Plaintiff contends that the Court committed manifest error in applying the stricter 
standard under the ADA rather than the less stringent standard for finding a disability 
following the 2008 Amendments to the ADA. Plaintiff also complains that the Court failed 
to address his failure to accommodate claim in its previous Ruling9 Because the Court
4 Collins v. Encompass Ins. Co., No. 06-8547, 2010 WL 1294056, *2  (E D. La. Mar. 26, 2010)(citing 
11 W righ t, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1, p. 125-27 (1995)).
5 Id., citing Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993); see 
also 11 W righ t, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1, p. 124 (1995).
6 Id., quoting Wright & Miller at § 2810.1, p. 124; see also Baustain v. Louisiana, 929 F.Supp. 980, 
981 (E. D. La. 1996).
7 See Ruling, Rec. Doc. No. 17.
8 The Court adopts by reference the Factual Background set forth in its previous Ruling, Rec. Doc. 
No. 17, pp. 1-2 and the Summary Judgment Standard as set forth on pp. 2-3.
9 The Court noted in footnote 43 of its previous Ruling that, because it ruled Plaintiff was not an 
individual with a disability under the ADA, which was the first prong of a prima facie denial of reasonable 
accommodation claim, there was no need to further address the accommodation claim. Rec. Doc. No. 17, 
p. 9, n. 43.
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failed to apply the less stringent standard following the 2008 ADA Amendments, the Court 
will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial on these claims.10 Nevertheless, the Court 
reaches the same conclusion that summary judgment in favor of the Defendant is proper 
on Plaintiffs claims.
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: AMENDMENTS AND APPLICATION
A. Effect of 2008 Amendments to the ADA
The ADAAA, which amended the ADA, became effective on January 1, 2009, and
expanded the coverage provided under the ADA.11 Particularly, the ADAAA instructs that
“substantially limits” should not be as strictly construed as some courts have required in
the past, and “should not require ‘extensive analysis.’”12 The court in Gamer v. Chevron
Phillips Chemical Co., L.P., summarized the amendments as follows:
The ADAAA has added “major bodily functions” (e.g., the immune system, 
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, 
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions) to the ADA’s list of major 
life activities, including caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, reading, 
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working, while defining “physical 
or mental impairment” as any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, as well 
as mental or psychological disorder.13
Moreover, while retaining the basic definition of disability under the ADA (“a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities”), "disability” now includes an impairment that is episodic or in
10 Plaintiff did not challenge the Court’s Ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant 
on Plaintiffs retaliation claim. Thus, this portion of the Court's ruling is undisturbed and remains in effect.
11 Garner v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., LP, 834 F.Supp.2d 528, 536 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
12 Id. at 538, citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3558.
13 Id. at 538-39, citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, Sec. 4, § 3(2)(A) and (B), 
122 Stat. 3553, 3555.
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remission if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active; 
examples include epilepsy, hypertension, asthma, diabetes, major 
depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and cancer.14 An impairment 
lasting less than six months can be substantially limiting.15 An impairment 
that is in remission but may return in a substantially limiting form is a 
disability under the ADAAA.16 The ADAAA also amended Toyota's definition 
of “major life activity” as “activities that are of central importance to most 
people's daily lives,” instead indicating that the word “major” must “not be 
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for disability.”17 Under the 
ADAAA, tasks involving major life activity of manual tasks, such as fine motor 
coordination, grasping, or pressuring, “need not constitute activities of central 
importance to most people’s lives.”18 To be “substantially limiting” an 
impairment does not have to prevent or significantly restrict a person from 
performing a major life activity.19
Also, “mitigation measures (such as medications, medical devices and assistive 
technology) are ignored when assessing whether an impairment substantially limits a 
person’s major life activities.”20 Furthermore, courts “may consider the negative effects of 
a mitigating measure, e.g., effects of medication, in determining whether the individual is 
substantially limited in a major life activity.”21
B. Prima facie Disability Discrimination
A plaintiff who alleges discrimination on the basis of a disability establishes a prima
'* Id. at 539, citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Sec. 4, § 3(4)(D), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555; 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.20(5).
15 Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
16 Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii).
17 Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2).
18 Id., citing Appendix to Part 1630, Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act§  1630.2(1); 76 Fed.Reg. at 17008.
19 Id. (citing Id.).
20 Id., citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Sec. 4 § 3(4)(E)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3556.
21 Id., citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Sec. 6 §501 ( I )(h), 122 Stat. 3553, 3558.
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facie case under the ADA “by showing that ‘1) he has a disability; 2) he is qualified for the 
position in which he seeks employment; and 3) he was discriminated against because of 
his disability.’”22 The ADA places the burden on the employee to prove that he is a 
qualified individual with a disability.23 A "qualified individual" is one “who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.”24 A plaintiff must show either that: “(1) he 
could perform the essential functions of the job in spite of his disability, or (2) that a 
reasonable accommodation of his disability would have enabled him to perform the 
essential functions of the job.”25
1. Disability
While Plaintiff correctly contends that the Court erroneously applied the stricter pre­
amendment standard for disability under the ADA, the Fifth Circuit has held that, 
“[although the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 lowered the standard that plaintiffs must 
meet to show that they are disabled, a plaintiff must still show substantial limitation.”26 
Plaintiff has offered scant evidence that he is substantially limited in any major life activity.
22 Green v. Medco Health Solutions of Texas, LLC, — F. Supp.2d —, 2013 WL 2317054 (N.D. Tex. 
2013)(quoting Griffin v. UPS, 661 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cir.2011); Maples v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at 
Galveston, No. 12-41226, 2013 WL 1777501, at *1-2, 2013 U.S.App. LEXIS 8535, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 
2013) (explaining that discrimination must be a “motivating factor” of the adverse action)).
23 See Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 218 (5lh Cir. 2000).
24 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
25 Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615,619 (5th Cir. 1999); see Appel v. Inspire Pharms., Inc., 
428 F. App’x 279, 284 (5lh Cir. 6/7/11)(“An employee who cannot perform essential job requirements, even 
with accommodation, is not a qualified person with a disability.”).
26 Mann v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, — F. App’x —, 2013 WL 2475116, at *4 (5th 
Cir. 7/11/13)(citing ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) & 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)).
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In fact, as set forth in the previous opinion, both Plaintiff and his nurse practitioner testified 
that he is not disabled.27
However, the regulations indicate that, in light of the principles set forth in the 
Amendments, certain types of impairments will be found, in virtually all cases, to constitute 
a “disability” under the ADA.28 The regulations explain that, “[g]iven their inherent nature, 
these types of impairments will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a 
substantial limitation on a major life activity” and therefore should demand only a "simple 
and straightforward” assessment.29 For example, the regulations state that it “should easily 
be concluded” that:
Deafness substantially limits hearing; blindness substantially limits seeing; 
an intellectual disability ... substantially limits brain function; partially or 
completely missing limbs or mobility impairments requiring the use of a 
wheelchair substantially limit musculoskeletal function; autism substantially 
limits brain function; cancer substantially limits normal cell growth; cerebral 
palsy substantially limits brain function; diabetes substantially limits 
endocrine function; epilepsy substantially limits neurological function; Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection substantially limits immune function; 
multiple sclerosis substantially limits neurological function; muscular 
dystrophy substantially limits neurological function; and major depressive 
disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive 
compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia substantially limit brain function....30
While “the Supreme Court has not decided what deference, if any, is due to
27 See Rec. Doc. No. 12-8, pp.21-22 and Rec. Doc. No. 12-7, p. 30. The Court has serious doubt that 
Plaintiff has provided sufficient summary judgment evidence that he is disabled, even under the ADAAA. 
Plaintiffs only evidence is the deposition testimony of his nurse practitioner, not a medical doctor. 
Furthermore, the alleged letter requesting accommodation, of which there is no evidence in the record but 
Defendant acknowledged it received, was written by Plaintiffs nurse practitioner at Plaintiffs direction. Rec. 
Doc. No. 12-8, p. 21. However, the Court will resolve this issue in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
28 29 C.F. R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
29 Id.
30 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).
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implementing regulations issued by the EEOC, it has relied on these regulations in 
analyzing cases, particularly when neither party to a case challenges their 
reasonableness.”31 Because neither party has challenged the reasonableness of the 
regulations, and the Court finds them to be instructive, the Court will find that Plaintiff has 
adequately alleged that he has a disability under the ADAAA. Thus, the Court will assume 
that Plaintiff is disabled for purposes of this opinion.
2. Qualified for the Position
Notably absent in any brief is an argument that Plaintiff is qualified for the position 
he held. As set forth above, a "qualified individual” is one who can, "with or without 
reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of the position” he holds or 
seeks.32 Plaintiff argues that if he had been taken off night call, he would have been able 
to work. The Court finds, however, that while changing Plaintiffs hours may have 
addressed his tardiness, it fails to explain how this change or any other accommodation 
would have resolved his routine failure to appear for work even during the day. The 
question becomes whether the accommodation requested, namely being relieved of night 
call duty, would render the Plaintiff "qualified for the position.” The Court is unpersuaded 
that allowing Plaintiff to come in later or to be removed from night call duty would have 
addressed the days that he failed to show for work at all.
In its original Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Defendant argued that a qualification for all employees is that they show up for work on a
31 Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 614 n.4.
32 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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routine basis and in accordance with their schedule.33 The Defendant further argued that, 
while Plaintiff alleged that he was fired due to his inability to work night hours, the evidence 
in the case established that Plaintiff also failed to show up for work during the day.34 
Nowhere in Plaintiffs Opposition is this fact challenged or rebutted.
The jurisprudence on this issue is clear: “Regular attendance is an essential function 
of most jobs;”35 “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what 
functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description 
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered 
evidence of the essential functions of the job.”36
As referenced in the Court’s previous Ruling, the undisputed record in this case 
establishes that Plaintiff was placed on probation by Defendant for excessive tardiness and 
absenteeism on July 12, 2012. This is evidenced by Plaintiffs signed acknowledgment 
wherein he stated: "I also understand that if I do not follow these rules and complete my 
duties I am subject to disciplinary actions and the possibility of termination of 
employment.”37 Despite this, Plaintiff continued to be late or not show up for work at all. 
It is clear that Plaintiff was placed on probation for these offenses prior to notifying
33 Rec. Doc. No. 12-1, p. 10.
34 Id., citing Exhibits A,B,C,G, & H.
35 Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. International Marine 
Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5"1 Cir. 1996)(holding that “[bjecause [the plaintiff] could not attend work, 
he is not a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA”)(citing Carrv. Reno, 23 F.3d 525-30 (D.C. Cir. 
1994)(holding that “coming to work regularly is essential function)).
36 Fuentes v. Krypton Solutions, LLC,No. 11-581, 2013 WL 1391113 (E.D. Tex. 4/4/13), citing 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(8).
37 Rec. Doc. No. 12-3.
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Defendant of Plaintiffs alleged disability and alleged requestfor accommodation. The first 
notice to Defendant of the Plaintiffs alleged disabilities and request for accommodation 
came on July 24, 2012. The Plaintiff next missed work on July 26, 2012 and was 
terminated on July 27, 2012. Plaintiffs undisputed employment records reveal that he had 
taken more than 109 hours of sick leave before July 27, 2012, the date of Plaintiffs 
termination, despite the fact that the Defendant allows only 80 hours of sick leave for each 
employee in an entire year. Thus, the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff was unable to 
perform an essential function of his job, that being regular attendance. Therefore, under 
the ADA, Plaintiff was not “qualified” and fails to carry his burden on this issue.
In Hypes v. First Commerce Corp.,3B the Fifth Circuit addressed a similar scenario. 
Hypes was a loan review analyst who exhibited a pattern of absenteeism and tardiness.38 9 
Following his reassignment, Hypes continued to struggle with attendance and was 
diagnosed with chronic obstructive lung disease, which required him to temporarily miss 
work on a short-term basis for testing and treatment.40 Hypes’ physician indicated that 
following treatment, Hypes should be able to resume a normal work schedule with no 
restrictions.41
After returning to work, Hypes was informed by his supervisor that he would be 
expected to be at work regularly and on time, and any medical absences would need
38 See n. 35, supra.
39 Id. at 724.
40 Id.
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proper documentation 42 Hypes’ immediate response was that he did not believe he could 
arrive at work at 8:30 a.m. or wear a neck tie. The employer denied both requests. Over 
the next two months, Hypes missed nine full days and seventeen half days of work 
resulting in his termination.43 In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment, 
the Fifth Circuit held that Hypes was not “otherwise qualified” for the position because “it 
was an essential function of his job, as a member of a team, that [plaintiff] be in the office, 
regularly, as near to normal business hours as possible, and that he work a full schedule.”44 
Because of Hypes’ excessive absenteeism, the court found that he “could not arrive at 
work early enough or often enough” to perform the job’s essential functions.45 Moreover, 
although Hypes did inform his employer that he would not be able to arrive at work at 8:30 
a.m., he did not suggest an accommodation that would resolve this difficulty.46 
Furthermore, even if the employer had allowed Hypes a flex time schedule allowing him 
to arrive two hours later, the court concluded that such an accommodation would not have 
solved the problem of consistently arriving four hours late and missing entire days.47 For 
this reason, the court upheld the summary judgment and determined Hypes was not 
“otherwise qualified.”48 The Fifth Circuit affirmed similar holdings in Willi v. American
42 Id.
43 Id. at 725.
44 Id. at 726.




Airlines In c49 and Ceasar v. United Services Automobile Association,50 and other district 
courts governed by the Fifth Circuit have applied this same reasoning.51
Applying this reasoning to the facts in the pending matter, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was a qualified individual because, with or without 
accommodation, Plaintiff could not perform his job ’s essential function of regular 
attendance. Plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issues of material fact on this 
issue.
3. Discriminated against “because of disability’’
Plaintiff also fails to establish that he was subjected to discrimination because of his 
disability. As set forth above, Plaintiffs excessive tardiness and absenteeism long pre-date 
his notice on July 24, 2012 to the Defendant that he is allegedly disabled. Further, the 
record is replete with undisputed evidence that Plaintiff was excessively tardy and absent 
despite warnings and probation for same. Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie 
case for disability discrimination, he has completely failed to present any competent 
summary judgment evidence which would show that the proffered legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reason for Plaintiffs termination is a pretext for discrimination.52
‘,9 288 F. App’x 126, 2008 WL 2570728 (5th Cir. 6/25/08).
50 102 F. App’x 859, 2004 WL 1448039 (5m Cir. 6/28/04).
51 See e g., Fuentes, supra n. 36 (Court held plaintiff was not “qualified individual" because he could 
not perform the job’s essential function of regular attendance at the time of his termination.); Yount v. S&4 
Restaurant Corp., No. 96-1400, 1997 WL 573463 (N.D. Tex. 9/8/97)(Court held plaintiff could not present 
prima facie discrimination claim under ADA because she was not qualified due to her “chronic absenteeism 
and tardiness”).
52 Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s alleged failure to engage in the interactive process after a 
requested accommodation is direct evidence of discrimination thereby rendering the burden-shifting analysis 
of McDonnell Douglas inapplicable. The Court disagrees that Plaintiff has presented direct evidence of 
discrimination on this claim for reasons set forth later in this opinion.
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C. Failure to Make a Reasonable Accommodation/Engage in Interactive 
Process
Underthe ADA, to “discriminate” includes "not making reasonable accommodations 
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability ... unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.”53 
Further, “'[a]n employee who needs an accommodation because of a disability has the 
responsibility of informing [his] employer.'”54 The Fifth Circuit has recognized that ‘“where 
the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not 
open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, the initial burden rests primarily upon the 
employee ... to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest 
the reasonable accommodations.’”55 "When a qualified individual with a disability requests 
a reasonable accommodation, the employer and employee should engage in flexible, 
interactive discussions to determine the appropriate accommodation.”56 “The ADA 
provides a right to reasonable accommodation, not to the employee's preferred 
accommodation.”57 “A disabled employee has no right to a promotion, to choose what job 
to which he will be assigned, or to receive the same compensation as he received 
previously.”58 “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that an available position exists
53 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
54 EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 621 (5th Cir.2009).
55 Id. at 621 (quoting Taylorv. Principal Fin. Grp., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
56 EEOC v. Agro Distrib., 555 F.3d 462, 471 (5th Cir.2009).
57 Id.
58 Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 316 (5,h Cir. 2007).
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that he was qualified for and could, with reasonable accommodations, perform.”59
To prevail on a claim of discrimination based on failure to accommodate a disability, 
the plaintiff must show that (1) the employer is covered by the statute; (2) he is an 
individual with a disability; (3) he can perform the essential functions of the job with or 
without reasonable accommodation; and (4) the employer had notice of the disability and 
failed to provide accommodation.60 The plaintiff has the burden to show that the employer 
failed to implement a reasonable accommodation.61
The Defendant is clearly covered by the Act, and the Court will again assume that 
Plaintiff is an individual with a disability. However, for the same reasons set forth 
previously in this opinion, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish that he could 
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation 
because he did not regularly attend work. Further, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to 
establish the fourth prong: that the Defendant had notice of the disability and failed to 
provide a reasonable accommodation.
1. Accommodation Provided
In his Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff argues that “nowhere in Defendant’s argument 
does it contend that it made a reasonable accommodation.”62 This, however, is not 
accurate. In its Ruling, the Court referenced the Defendant’s Answer wherein it alleged
59 Id. at 315.
60 Mzyk v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 F. App'x 13, 16 n. 3 (5th Cir.9/30/10) (citations omitted).
61 Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir.1996).
62 Rec. Doc. No. 19-1, p. 2.
Doc#771 13
that it took Plaintiff off night call duty.63 The Court also considered as summary judgment 
evidence the Affidavit of Jaimie Fontenot,64 Defendant’s Operations Manager, attached to 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Fontenot testified that he “took Chad 
Blackard off of ‘night call’ after receiving a letter from plaintiffs nurse practitioner.”65 Thus, 
summary judgment evidence was introduced showing that Defendant, although it did not 
consider the Plaintiff to have a disability, responded to the Plaintiffs nurse practitioner’s 
letter by taking Plaintiff off of “night call” duty. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that, to his 
knowledge, he was never taken off night call duty.66 However, Plaintiff also testified that 
Fontenot said everyone has to be on call, but he would “talk to the board.”67 Plaintiffs 
failure to report to work on the second day following his alleged accommodation request 
may have contributed to his lack of knowledge of such accommodation.
Alternatively, even if the Defendant had not provided this “night call” duty 
accommodation, the Plaintiff has not carried his burden of proving that such 
accommodation was reasonable in light of his persistent absenteeism. As stated 
previously, Plaintiff has failed to show how removing him from “night call” duty would have 
resolved his routine failure to appear for work when scheduled to work during the day.
2. Reasonableness
Curiously, neither party provided as an exhibit the letter from Plaintiffs nurse
63 Rec. Doc. No. 5, H 7.
64 Rec. Doc. No. 12-9. The Court inadvertently failed to cite to this Affidavit in its previous Ruling, 
however, it was considered as summary judgment evidence which was not rebutted by the Plaintiff.
65 Id. at U 4.
66 Rec. Doc. No. 16-2, p. 2.
67 Id.
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practitioner allegedly advising the Defendant of Plaintiffs alleged disabilities and requesting 
some accommodation. The law is clear that, ‘“the ADA provides a right to reasonable 
accommodation, noftotheem ployee’spreferrec/accomrnodation.’”68 Without knowing the 
exact accommodations requested, the Court assumes from the arguments that Plaintiff 
asked to be removed from “night call” duty and/or allowed to come in later. As discussed 
above, the record before the Court shows that Plaintiff was taken off night call duty. The 
only dispute is whether the Plaintiff was so advised. The Court does not believe, and the 
applicable jurisprudence does not appear to require, that an employer allow an employee 
to come in late or otherwise change his hours when that employee regularly fails to appear 
for work at all.69 The Court is also unpersuaded that the Defendant was required to 
accommodate the Plaintiff by taking him off of night call duty because Plaintiff has offered 
no evidence that this request would accommodate Plaintiff in some way that would enable 
him to perform the essential functions of his job.
3. Interactive Process
Plaintiff also contends that once he submitted the letter requesting accommodation 
for his disabilities, the Defendant was obligated to engage in the interactive process 
required by the ADA. Under the facts of this case, the Court disagrees. In Green v. Medco 
Health Solutions,70 a case decided by the district court for the Northern District of Texas, 
the plaintiff (“Green”) made similar claims. Green was a customer service representative
68 Martel v. Evangeline Parish School Board, No. 10-00878, 2012 WL 3637614, *8 (W.D. La. 
8/21/12)(quoting EEOC v. AgroDistrib., 555 F.3d 462, 471 (5th Cir. 2009)(emphasis in original)).
69 See Hypes, supra.
70 947 F. Supp. 2d 712 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
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who had been promoted to Resolution Team Leader for the Defendant company and was 
subject to a strict attendance policy.71 As Resolution Team Leader, Green was 
reprimanded for fourteen late arrivals and nine unscheduled absences before she was 
issued a warning. Despite this warning, Green’s poor attendance persisted.72 Green 
suffered from idiopathic intracranial hypertension and empty sella syndrome, which 
required herto attend numerous medical appointments and treatments with various doctors 
and specialists.73 Although the defendant claimed it terminated Green for excessive 
unexcused absences, Green claimed she was subjected to disability discrimination.74
Among other claims, Green argued the defendant failed to reasonably 
accommodate her disability and failed to engage in the interactive process of determining 
a reasonable accommodation as required by the ADA.75 While Green was suspended from 
work and awaiting a return-to-work release from her doctor, she made the following 
accommodation requests: (1) a night shift schedule; (2) a day schedule that would allow 
herto leave work for appointments and make up work later; and (3) a split-shift schedule 
to accommodate her appointments.76 The defendant argued Green’s requests were 
untimely because she had been effectively terminated prior to the requests, and “because 
no accommodations could forgive her unexcused absences, which warranted immediate
71 Id. at 716-17.
72 Id. at 717.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 726.
76 Id. at 727.
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termination. »77
The court held that the fact that defendant did not process Green’s termination until
after her requested accommodation did not “render it obligated to engage in the interactive
process instead of terminating Plaintiff.”7 8 The court continued:
In situations where an employee’s termination based on a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason has been made effective but has not yet been 
processed, courts must not permit the employee to use the ADA as a shield 
from being fired by suddenly requesting an accommodation before the ink on 
her valid termination papers is dry. "The ADA does not ... create an 
impenetrable barrier around the disabled employee, preventing the employer 
from taking any employment actions vis-a-vis the employee.”79
The court found in the alternative that the defendant was not required to engage in
the interactive process “because Plaintiffs request for accommodations did not and could
not include a request to forgive her two months of unexcused absences. Courts have
consistently explained that a ‘second chance’ orforgiveness of prior misconduct otherwise
warranting termination is not a 'reasonable accommodation.’”80 The court also stated:
‘“Since [a] reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is not required
to excuse past misconduct even if it is the result of the individual’s disability.'”81 Further,
77 id.
78 Id. at 728-29.
79 Id. at 729, quoting Kent v. Roman Catholic Church, No. 96-1505, 1997 WL 30201, at * 2 (E D. La. 
Jan. 22, 1997).
80 Id., quoting Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90F.Supp.2d 993,1006-08 (S.D.Ind.2000) 
(citing Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666-67 (7th Cir. 1995)).
81 Id., quoting Brookins, 90 F.Supp.2d at 1007 (citing U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Flardship Under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act at 24, question number 35); see Davila v. Qwest Corp., 113 Fed.Appx. 849, 
854 (10th Cir.2004) (“[A]s many cases have recognized in various contexts, excusing workplace misconduct 
to provide a fresh start/second chance to an employee whose disability could be offered as an after-the-fact 
excuse is not a required accommodation under the ADA.”).
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“[t]he Fifth Circuit has explained in a related context that an employer is obligated to 
provide reasonable accommodations for a disability but is not required to approve a 
‘retroactive accommodation’ or ‘second chance’ excusing prior misconduct stemming from 
the alleged disability.”82 The court ultimately held that, “even if Plaintiffs termination had 
not been effective until the actual date of termination, ... there was no requirement that 
Defendant consider Plaintiffs request when her misconduct, i.e., multiple absences 
definitely determined on December 7 to be unexcused, required her immediate 
termination.”83 84
The Court recognizes that, unlike Green, Plaintiff was not in the process of being 
terminated at the time of his accommodation request. Plaintiff was, however, on probation 
for the very conduct which resulted in his termination. Thus, the Court finds the analysis 
regarding an employer not being required to forgive past misconduct directly applicable and 
on point under the facts of this case. Plaintiffs work history already contained sufficient 
grounds for his termination prior to the alleged request for accommodation.
The Court is also guided by the analysis and reasoning in Earl v. Mervyn’s, ln c BA 
In Earl, the plaintiff suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder ("OCD”) which she 
argued caused her excessive tardiness at work. The plaintiff was disciplined for her 
“punctuality infractions” in accordance with the defendant’s company policy.85 In fact,
82 Id., citing Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 n. 14 (5th Cir.1997) (evaluating alcoholism 
under pre-2008 version of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
83 Id.
84 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000). The Court acknowledges that Ear! is not binding; however, the 
Court believes the analysis and reasoning given the factual similarities with the case at bar render the Ead 
decision persuasive.
85 Id. at 1364.
Doc#771 18
despite being placed on the third step of the corrective action policy and given a 
probationary warning, the plaintiff continued to be late.86 On one particular late day during 
this corrective period, the plaintiff requested that she be allowed to clock in whenever she 
arrived, without reprimand, and be permitted to make up the time at the end of her shift.87 
The defendant rejected this request as unreasonable but offered to schedule the plaintiff 
on an afternoon or evening shift at her request.88 Despite this, plaintiff subsequently 
incurred two additional punctuality infractions, "which would have warranted her dismissal 
under the terms of Appellee’s policy.”89 Although the defendant could have discharged the 
plaintiff at that time, it provided the plaintiff with a second probationary warning.90 Twice 
more following this warning, the plaintiff was late; thus, the plaintiff was suspended pending 
an evaluation regarding her discharge. The decision was made to terminate the plaintiff.91 
The plaintiff sued the defendant claiming she was terminated in violation of the ADA and 
FMLA; the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and the 
plaintiff appealed.92
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, finding that punctuality was 






91 Id. at 1365.
92 Id.
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accommodation, which rendered her unqualified forthe position.93 The plaintiff argued that 
the defendant had failed to begin the required interactive process to determine a 
reasonable accommodation for her, failed to act in good faith in finding such an 
accommodation, and failed to show an undue hardship.94 These arguments were rejected 
by the district and appellate courts.
The Eleventh Circuit stated that “[t]he burden of identifying an accommodation that 
would allow a qualified employee to perform the essential functions of her job rests with 
that employee, as does the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to showing that 
such accommodation is reasonable.”95 Also, '“where a plaintiff cannot demonstrate 
“reasonable accommodation,” the employer’s lack of investigation into reasonable 
accommodation is unimportant.’”96 The court held that “[a] request to arrive at work at any 
time, without reprimand, would in essence require Appellee to change the essential 
functions of Appellant’s job, and thus is not a request for a reasonable accommodation. 
Appellee was therefore under no duty to engage in an ‘interactive process’ or to show 
undue hardship.”97
Accordingly, the Court finds that based on the Plaintiffs work history of excessive 
tardiness and absenteeism, which continued even after he was placed on probation, the 
Defendant was entitled to terminate Plaintiff prior to his alleged accommodation request.
93 Id. at 1366.
94 Id. at 1366-67.
95 Id. at 1367, citing Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278,1286 (11th Cir.
1997).
96 Id., quoting Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11"’ Cir. 1997).
97 Id.
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The Defendant was under no obligation, upon receiving Plaintiffs letter, to forgive or 
excuse the Plaintiffs abundant misconduct. Furthermore, Plaintiffs failure to report for 
work on the second day following his alleged accommodation request suggests to the 
Court that Plaintiff may have only requested the accommodation in an effort to “use the 
ADA as a shield” to circumvent his clearly predictable termination.98 910
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial." 
The Court has re-evaluated the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence. For those 
reasons set forth above, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment.1100 The Court’s previous Ruling101 on Plaintiffs retaliation claim remains 
unchanged. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, thi day of January, 2014.




98 See n. 76, supra.
99 Rec. Doc. No. 19.
100 Rec. Doc. No. 12.
101 Rec. Doc. No. 17.
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